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### 91XDVF - FARRELL DEANNA

This is the only accessible and readable introduction to the history, logic, moral implications, and political tendencies of the idea of rights. It is organized chronologically, and discusses important events, such as the French Revolution. As an undergraduate text it is well-suited to introductions to political philosophy, moral philosophy, and ethics. It could also be used in courses on political theory in departments of political science and government, and in courses on legal theory in law schools.

An elaboration and defence of the first truly global political morality in human history: the morality of human rights.

Writers on human dignity roughly divide between those who stress the social origins of this concept and its role in marking rank and hierarchy, and those who follow Kant in grounding dignity in an abstract and idealized philosophical conception of human beings. In these lectures, Jeremy Waldron contrives to combine attractive features of both strands. In the first lecture, Waldron presents a conception of dignity that preserves its ancient association with rank and station, thus allowing him to tap rich historical resources while avoiding what many perceive as the excessive abstraction and dubious metaphysics of the Kantian strand. At the same time he argues for a conception of human dignity that amounts to a generalization of high status across all human beings, and so attains the appealing universality of the Kantian position. The second lecture focuses particularly on the importance of dignity - understood in this way - as a status defining persons' relation to law: their presentation as persons capable of self-applying the law, capable of presenting and arguing a point of view, and capable of responding to law's demands without brute coercion. Together the two lectures illuminate the relation between dignity conceived as the ground of rights and dignity conceived as the content of rights; they also illuminate important ideas about dignity as noble bearing and dignity as the subject of a right against degrading treatment; and they help us understand the sense in which dignity is better conceived as a status than as a kind of value.

Human rights and the courts and tribunals that protect them are increasingly part of our moral, legal, and political circumstances. The growing salience of human rights has recently brought the question of their philosophical foundation to the foreground. Theorists of human rights often assume that their ideal can be traced to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his view of humans as ends in themselves. Yet, few have attempted to explore exactly how human rights should be understood in a Kantian framework. The scholars in this book have gathered to fill this gap. At the center of Kant's theory of rights is a view of freedom as independence from domination. The chapters explore the significance of this theory for the nature of human rights, their justification, and the legitimacy of international human rights courts.

Human rights can be understood as moral or political. This volume shows how this distinction matters for theory and practice

What is a human right? How can we tell whether a proposed human right really is one? How do we establish the content of particular human rights, and how do we resolve conflicts between them? These are pressing questions for philosophers, political theorists, jurists, international lawyers, and activists. James Griffin offers answers in his compelling new investigation of the foundations of human rights. First, *On Human Rights* traces the idea of a natural right from its origin in the late Middle Ages, when the rights were seen as deriving from natural laws, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the original theological background was progressively dropped and 'natural law' emptied of most of its original meaning. By the end of the Enlightenment, the term 'human rights' (*droits de l'homme*) appeared, marking the purge of the theological background. But the Enlightenment, in putting nothing in its place, left us with an unsatisfactory, incomplete idea of a human right. Griffin shows how the language of human rights has become debased. There are scarcely any accepted criteria, either in the academic or the public sphere, for correct use of the term. He takes on the task of showing the way towards a determinate concept of human rights, based on their relation to the human status that we all share. He works from certain paradigm cases, such as freedom of expression and freedom of worship, to more disputed cases such as welfare rights - for instance the idea of a human right to health. His goal is a substantive account of human rights - an account with enough content to tell us whether proposed rights really are rights. Griffin emphasizes the practical as well as theoretical urgency of this goal: as the United Nations recognized in 1948 with its Universal Declaration, the idea of human rights has considerable power to improve the lot of humanity around the world. We can't do without the idea of human rights, and we need to get clear about it. It is our job now - the job of this book - to influence and develop the unsettled discourse of human rights so as to complete the incomplete idea.

This book provides a moral assessment of the heart of the modern human rights enterprise: the system of international legal human rights. Any attempt to achieve a moral assessment of that enterprise must first evaluate the system of international legal human rights, which includes both legal norms and the institutions that create, interpret, and implement them. When philosophers have addressed the system of international legal human rights at all, they have tended to assume that international legal human rights, when they are morally justified, mirror, or at least help to realize, pre-existing moral human rights. But international legal human rights, like many other legal rights, can be justified by appeal to several different types of moral considerations, of which the need to realize preexisting moral individual rights is only one. Justifying the system of international legal human rights requires not only advancing sound arguments for international legal human rights norms, but also an account of the legitimacy of the institutions of the international legal human rights system. It also requires showing that the legal rights in question should be part of a system of international law, rather than merely being included in domestic legal systems. Finally, justification also requires an account of the supremacy of international human rights law: a determination of whether and if so under what conditions, international human rights law should trump domestic law, including the constitutional law of the best existing liberal democratic states --

Forrester discusses animal rights, obligations concerning future generations, abortion, limiting medical treatment, and euthanasia. Persons are defined as individuals who ought to be treated in accordance with all sound moral principles. The author develops an account of what moral principles are sound, how we can apply them to complex situations, and what makes it reasonable to treat individuals in accordance with particular moral principles. This discussion puts the book's practical conclusions on a sounder basis than much other work on practical ethics. Most such authors state some general principles, but say little about why these principles should be accepted. Moreover, they rarely show how general principles can generate answers to specific dilemmas. Some even maintain that general principles are irrelevant. Since Forrester is both a nurse practitioner and a philosopher, she has had direct acquaintance with many agonizing situations in medicine. Summaries of the theoretical conclusions are included to enable nonprofessionals to follow the discussion of practical issues. The book will thus interest not only professional philosophers, but also non-philosophers concerned with problems in medical and environmental ethics, abortion, and animal rights.

Powerful emotion and pursuit of self-interest have many times led people to break the law with the belief that they are doing so with sound moral reasons. This study is a comprehensive philosophical and legal analysis of the gray area in which the foundations of law and morality clash. In examining the extent of the obligations owed by citizens to their government, Greenawalt concentrates on the possible existence of a single source of obligation that reaches all citizens and all laws.

Provides students with an introduction to legal philosophy, using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to reflect on human rights.

All students and advocates of human rights will be interested in this concerted exploration of the human rights moral obligations that fall, not directly on states, but on private and public organisations. Such an approach to human rights opens up the possibility of holding corporations and bureaucracies to account for human rights violations even when they have acted in accordance with the law. This interdisciplinary and international project brings together eminent philosophers, lawyers, social scientists and practitioners to articulate theoretically and develop in practical contexts the moral implications of human rights for non-state actors. What emerges from the book as a whole is a distinctive contemporary vision of the emerging moral impact of human rights and its significance for organisational behaviour and performance.

Human rights can be understood as moral or political. This volume shows how this distinction matters for theory and practice.

The notion of "human rights" is widely used in political and moral discussions. The core idea, that all human beings have some inalienable basic rights, is appealing and has an eminently practical function: It allows moral criticism of various wrongs and calls for action in order to prevent them. On the other hand it is unclear what exactly a human right is. Human rights lack a convincing conceptual foundation that would be able to compel the wrong-doer to accept human rights claims as well-founded. Hence the practical function faces theoretical doubts. The present collection takes up the tension between the wide political use of human rights claims and the intellectual skepticism about them. In particular two major issues are identified that call for conceptual clarification in order to better understand human rights claims both in theory and in practice: the question of how to justify human rights and the tension between universal normative claims and particular moralities.

"Human rights include individual rights against government oppression, such as the right to freedom of thought, religion, speech, assembly, and to a fair system of criminal justice. But even in this basic political sense, ""human rights"" means different things in different historical and cultural contexts and advocacy of such rights has frequently been viewed as subjective. *Justifying Ethics* offers a thorough critique of the most common attempts to formulate objective standards through appeals to human nature, religion, and reason. Gorecki opens his inquiry by considering the role of norm-making concepts in the history of ethical thought: how standards of rights were claimed to conform to human nature and reason or have been stipulated by an external authoritative source such as God or social contracts. He then shows how such justifications may be discounted on analytical or practical grounds using such examples as divine will, Kantian reason, and the truth value of moral judgments. With respect to empirically grounded appeals to human nature, Gorecki argues against the notion that the innate plasticity of human behavior and potential for social diversity is sufficient grounds for human rights activity without objective justification. The search for justification remains essential in enhancing the persuasiveness of ethical action that aims at the moral ""contagion"" of the people by the human rights experience and the transition from moral acceptance to legal implementation. Broad in intellectual scope, *Justifying Ethics* draws upon moral and political philosophy, social policy, psychology, history, jurisprudence, and international law to clarify the prerequisites for the success of human rights activity. The book will be of special interest to political theorists, philosophers, sociologists, and human rights activists."

This book makes two important contributions toward a general and systematic theory of rights—a powerful philosophical analysis of the language of rights and an explanation of the nature of rights. In working out these ideas, Wellman has provided a new and cohesive way of thinking and talking about rights of every sort. Wellman succeeds in bringing all kinds of rights—moral, legal, institutional, etc.—under one unified theory in a way that illuminates their similarities and differences. This enables him to deal in a consistent way with a very broad range of philosophical questions, questions that are too often dealt with in isolation from each other.

The history of human rights suggests that individuals should be empowered in their natural, political, social and economic vulnerabilities. States within the international arena hold each other responsible for doing just that and support or interfere where necessary. States are to protect these essential human vulnerabilities, even when this is not a matter of self-interest. This function of human rights is recognized in contexts of intervention, genocide, humanitarian aid and development. This book develops the idea of environmental obligations as long-term responsibilities in the con-

text of human rights. It proposes that human rights require recognition that, in the face of unsustainable conduct, future human persons are exposed and vulnerable. It explores the obstacles for long-term responsibilities that human rights law provides at the level of international and national law and challenges the question of whether lifestyle restrictions are enforceable in view of liberties and levels of wellbeing typically seen as protected by human rights. The book will be of interest to postgraduates studying Human Rights, Sustainability, Law and Philosophy.

Human dignity: social movements invoke it, several national constitutions enshrine it, and it features prominently in international human rights documents. But what is human dignity, why is it important, and what is its relationship to human rights? This book offers a sophisticated and comprehensive defence of the view that human dignity is the moral heart of human rights. First, it clarifies the network of concepts associated with dignity. Paramount within this network is a core notion of human dignity as an inherent, non-instrumental, egalitarian, and high-priority normative status of human persons. People have this status in virtue of their valuable human capacities rather than as a result of their national origin and other conventional features. Second, it shows how human dignity gives rise to an inspiring ideal of solidaristic empowerment, which calls us to support people's pursuit of a flourishing life by affirming both negative duties not to block or destroy, and positive duties to protect and facilitate, the development and exercise of the valuable capacities at the basis of their dignity. The most urgent of these duties are correlative to human rights. Third, this book illustrates how the proposed dignitarian approach allows us to articulate the content, justification, and feasible implementation of specific human rights, including contested ones, such as the rights to democratic political participation and to decent labour conditions. Finally, this book's dignitarian approach helps illuminate the arc of humanist justice, identifying both the difference and the continuity between the basic requirements of human rights and more expansive requirements of social justice such as those defended by liberal egalitarians and democratic socialists. Human dignity is indeed the moral heart of human rights. Understanding it enables us to defend human rights as the urgent ethical and political project that puts humanity first.

The Proliferation of Rights explores how the assertion of rights has expanded dramatically since World War II. Carl Wellman illuminates for the reader the historical developments in each of the major categories of rights, including human rights, civil rights, women's rights, patient rights, and animal rights. He concludes by assessing where this proliferation has been legitimate and helpful, cases where it has been illusory and unproductive, and alternatives to the appeal to rights.

Universal Human Rights brings new clarity to the important and highly contested concept universal human rights. The Charter of the United Nations commits nearly all nations of the world to promote, to realize and take action to achieve human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, yet this formal consensus masks an underlying confusion about the philosophical basis and practical implications of rights in a world made up of radically different national communities. This collection of essays explores the foundations of universal human rights in four sections devoted to their nature, application, enforcement and limits, concluding that shared rights help to constitute a universal human community, which supports local customs and separate state sovereignty. Rights protect the benefits of cultural diversity, while recognizing the universal dignity that every human life deserves. The eleven contributors to this volume demonstrate from their very different perspectives how human rights can help to bring moral order to an otherwise divided world.

Why are all persons due equal respect? Andrea Sangiovanni rejects the view that human dignity is grounded in our capacities for reason, love, etc. Rather than focus on the basis for equality, we should focus on inequality: Why and when is it wrong to treat others as inferior? Moral equality, he writes, is best explained by a rejection of cruelty.

It's been more than two decades since the first edition of this landmark book garnered public accolades for its sensitive yet honest and forthright approach to the many disquieting questions surrounding the emotional debate over animal rights. Is moral concern something owed by human beings only to human beings? Drawing upon his philosophical expertise, his extensive experience of working with animal issues all over the world, and his knowledge of biological science, Bernard E. Rollin - now widely recognized as the father of veterinary ethics - develops a compelling analysis of animal rights as it is emerging in society. The result is a sound basis for rational discussion and social policy development in this area of rapidly growing concern. He believes that society must elevate the moral status of animals and protect their rights as determined by their natures. His public speaking and published works have contributed to passage of major federal legislation designed to increase the well-being of laboratory animals. This new third edition is greatly expanded and includes a new chapter on animal agriculture, plus additional discussions of animal law, companion animal issues, genetic engineering, animal pain, animal research, and many other topics.

#### 4.2. The Liberal Retreat

Is it defensible to use the concept of a right? Can we justify rights' central place in modern moral and legal thinking, or does the concept unjustifiably side-line those who do not qualify as right-holders? Rowan Cruft develops a new account of rights. Moving beyond the traditional 'interest theory' and 'will theory', he defends a distinctive 'addressive' approach that brings together duty-bearer and right-holder in the first person. This view has important implications for the idea of 'natural' moral rights-that is, rights that exist independently of anyone's recognizing that they do. Cruft argues that only moral duties grounded in the good of a particular party (person, animal, group) are naturally owed to that party as their rights. He argues that human rights in law and morality should be founded on such recognition-independent rights. In relation to property, however, matters are complicated because much property is justifiable only by collective goods beyond the rightholder's own good. For such property, Cruft argues that a new non-rights property system-that resembles markets but is not conceived in terms of rights-would be possible. The result of this study is a partial vindication of the rights concept that is more supportive of human rights than many of their critics (from left or right) might expect, and is surprisingly doubtful about property as an individual right.

What gives an animal 'rights'? What makes product testing on animals wrong? In *Animal Rights, Human Wrongs* prominent activist and philosopher Tom Regan skillfully puts forth the argument for animal rights through the exploration of two questions central to moral theory: What makes an act right? What makes an act wrong? Taking into consideration moral theories such as contractarianism, utilitarianism, and Kantian ethics, Regan provides the theoretical framework that grounds a responsible pro-animal rights perspective, and ultimately explores how asking moral questions about other animals can lead to a better understanding of ourselves. The necessity of making a transition from moral theory to moral practice becomes

startlingly clear as Reagan examines the commonplace, everyday choices that would be affected by believing in a moral theory that affirms the rights of animals. For the many people who have ever wondered 'what difference does it make if animals have rights,' *Animal Rights, Humans Wrongs* provides a provocative and intriguing answer. For a discussion of animal rights tailored to a more general audience, see *Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

This book presents a theory of personhood and moral personhood using results from recent work on intentionality in the philosophy of mind. An account of intentional kinds, causation, and explanation is provided to resolve some current issues in moral and legal theory, and to examine questions raised in law and medicine where it is necessary to deal with human individuals at the boundaries of their lives. Topics discussed include abortion, death, euthanasia, personal identity, rights -- including the right to privacy and the right to die -- servility, and suicide.

Mary Anne Warren explores a theoretical question which lies at the heart of practical ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? In other words, what are the criteria for being an entity towards which people have moral obligations? Some philosophers maintain that there is one intrinsic property—for instance, life, sentience, humanity, or moral agency. Others believe that relational properties, such as belonging to a human community, are more important. In Part I of the book, Warren argues that no single property can serve as the sole criterion for moral status; instead, life, sentience, moral agency, and social and biotic relationships are all relevant, each in a different way. She presents seven basic principles, each focusing on a property that can, in combination with others, legitimately affect an agent's moral obligations towards entities of a given type. In Part II, these principles are applied in an examination of three controversial ethical issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion

Debate regarding organ sales is largely innocent of the history of thought on the matter. This volume seeks to remedy this shortcoming. Positions for or against a market in human organs are nested within moral intuitions, ontological or political theoretical premises, or understandings of special moral concerns, such as permissible uses of the body, which have a long history of analysis. The essays compass the views of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Mill and Christianity, as well as particular methodological approaches, such as the phenomenology of the body, natural law theory, legal theory and libertarian critique of legal theory. These discussions cluster a number of conceptually independent philosophical concerns: (1) What is the appropriate understanding of the relationship between persons and their bodies? (2) What does it mean to 'own' an organ? (3) Do governments have moral authority to regulate how persons use their own body parts? (4) What are the costs and benefits of a market in human organs? Such questions are related by an urgent public health challenge: the considerable disparity between the number of patients who could significantly benefit from organ transplantation and the number of human organs available for transplantation. This volume explores the theoretical, normative, and historical foundations for alternative policies for procurement and transplantation of human organs.

Readership: This book would be suitable for students, academics and scholars of law, philosophy, politics, international relations and economics

In this book I argue for an approach that conceives human rights as both moral and legal rights. The merit of such an approach is its capacity to understand human rights more in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable beings would like to live in rather than simply in terms of what each individual is legally entitled to. While I acknowledge that every human being has the moral entitlement to be granted living conditions that are conducive to a dignified life, I maintain, at the same time, that the moral and legal aspects of human rights are complementary and should be given equal weight. The legal aspect compensates for the limitations of moral human rights the observance of which depends on the conscience of the individual, and the moral aspect tempers the mechanical and inhumane application of the law. Unlike the traditional or orthodox approach, which conceives human rights as rights that individuals have by virtue of their humanity, and the political or practical approach, which understands human rights as legal rights that are meant to limit the sovereignty of the state, the moral-legal approach reconciles law and morality in human rights discourse and underlines the importance of a legal framework that compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. It not only challenges the exclusively negative approach to fundamental liberties but also emphasizes the necessity of an enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from violating the rights of others. Without the legal mechanism of enforcement, the understanding of human rights would be reduced to simply framing moral claims against injustices. From the moral-legal approach, the protection of human rights is understood as a common and shared responsibility. Such a responsibility goes beyond the boundaries of nation-states and requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime based on the conviction that all human beings are members of a community of fate and that they share common values which transcend the limits of their individual states. In a cosmopolitan human rights regime, people are protected as persons and not as citizens of a particular state.

Moral Rights and Their Grounds offers a novel theory of rights based on two distinct views. The first—the value view of rights—argues that for a person to have a right is to be valuable in a certain way, or to have a value property. This special type of value is in turn identified by the reasons that others have for treating the right holder in certain ways, and that correlate with the value in question. David Alm then argues that the familiar agency view of rights should be replaced with a different version according to which persons' rights, and thus at least in part their value, are based on their actions rather than their mere agency. This view, which Alm calls exercise-based rights, retains some of the most valuable features of the agency view while also defending it against common objections concerning right loss. This book presents a unique conception of exercise-based rights that will be of keen interest to ethicists, legal philosophers, and political philosophers interested in rights theory.

Completely revised and updated to bring it up to date with recent events, this popular textbook incorporates a wide range of carefully edited materials from both primary and secondary sources.

Human Rights Ethics makes an important contribution to contemporary philosophical and political debates concerning the advancement of global justice and human rights. Butler's book also lays claim to a significant place in both normative ethics and human rights studies in as much as it seeks to vindicate a universalistic, rational approach to human rights ethics. Butler's innovative approach is not based on murky claims to "natural rights" that supposedly hold wherever human beings exist; nor does it succumb to the traditional problems of justification associated with utilitarianism, Kantianism, and other procedural approaches to human rights studies. Instead, Butler proposes "a dialectical justification of human rights by indirect proof" that claims not to be question begging. Very much in the spirit of Hegel and Habermas, Butler proposes to vindicate a "totally rational account of hu-

man rights," but one that depends concretely and historically on a dialectically constructed "right to freedom of thought in its universal modes."

Over the past decade or so, philosophical speculation about human rights has tended to fall into two streams. On the one hand, there are "Orthodox" theorists, who think of human rights as natural rights: moral rights that we have simply in virtue of being human. On the other hand, there are "Political" theorists, who think of human rights as rights that play a distinctive role, or set of roles, in modern international politics: setting universal standards of political legitimacy, serving as norms of international concern, and/or imposing limits on the exercise of national sovereignty. This edited volume explores this disagreement, its underlying sources, and related issues in the philosophy of human rights. Using the Orthodox-Political debate as a springboard for broader reflection, the volume covers a diverse range of questions about: the relevance of the history of human rights to their philosophical comprehension; how to properly understand the relationship between human rights morality and law; how to balance the normative character of human rights - their description of an ideal world - with the requirement that they be feasible in the here and now; the role of human rights in a world shaped by politics and power; and how to reconcile the individualistic and communitarian aspects of human rights. All chapters are accompanied by useful and probing commentaries, which help to create dialogues throughout the entire volume.

In *The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights*, Carl Wellman takes a broad approach to human rights by discussing all three types - moral, international, and national - at length. At the same time, Wellman pays special attention to the moral reasons that are relevant to each kind of human rights.

In *Beyond Prejudice*, Evelyn B. Pluhar defends the view that any sentient conative being--one capable of caring about what happens to him or herself--is morally significant, a view that supports the moral status and rights of many nonhuman animals. Confronting traditional and contemporary philosophical arguments, she offers in clear and accessible fashion a thorough examination of theories of moral significance while decisively demonstrating the flaws in the arguments of those who would avoid attributing moral rights to nonhumans. Exposing the traditional view--which restricts the moral realm to autonomous, fully fledged "persons"--as having horrific implications for the treatment of many humans, Pluhar goes on to argue positively that sentient individuals of any species are no less morally significant than the most autonomous human. Her position provides the ultimate justification that is missing from previous defenses of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In the process of advancing her position, Pluhar discusses the implications of determining moral significance for children and "abnormal" humans as well as its relevance to population policies, the raising of animals for food or product testing, decisions on hunting and euthanasia, and the treatment of companion animals. In addition, the author scrutinizes recent assertions by environmental ethicists that all living things or that natural objects and ecosystems be considered highly morally significant. This powerful book of moral theory challenges all defenders of the moral status quo--which decrees that animals decidedly do not count--to reevaluate their convictions.

This volume focuses on the ethical significance of human rights, aiming at contributing to a universal culture of human rights with deep roots and wide horizons. Its purpose, scope and rationale are reflected in the three-part structure of the manuscript. Part I has a broad introductory historical, theoretical and legal character. Part II submits that an Ethics of Human Rights is best understood as an Ethics of Recognition of human worth, dignity and rights. Moreover, it is argued that human worth consists in the perfectibility of the human species, rooted in its semiotic nature, to be accomplished through the perfecting of human beings, for which the right to education is key. In Part III, the main legal and political outcomes of the Human Rights Revolution are described and answers to the most lasting and common criticisms of human rights are provided. To conclude, the human stature of the Big Five drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is profiled and the priority that should be recognized to human rights education is highlighted. Some appendices supplement the manuscript. While making a case for the high value and liberating power of the idea and ideal of human rights, objections, controversies and uncertainties are not at all overlooked and emerging issues are explored. The diversity of content of this volume meets many needs of the typical syllabus for a human rights course.

This book provides a complete and convincing account of what rights we do and do not have, who has them, and why. Presenting the foundations of a liberal, individualistic theory of rights, Lomasky explains the place of rights within the overall structure of morality, arguing for the moral importance of individual commitments to and pursuit of "projects." After developing his theory of basic rights, Lomasky demonstrates its implications for a variety of problems and issues, including property rights, the rights of children, and the status of the unborn, defective persons, animals, and even the dead. Arguing for a fundamental reshaping of philosophical ethics, Lomasky develops a credible alternative to currently fashionable views.

Many debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often controversial: if a human's capacities are the basis of its moral status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? This book answers this question by arguing that if something is human, it has a set of typical human capacities; that if something has a set of typical human capacities, it has serious moral status; and thus all human beings have the same sort of serious moral status as you and I. Beginning from what our common intuitions tell us about situations involving "temporary incapacitation"—where a human organism has, then loses, then regains a certain capacity—this book argues for substantive conclusions regarding human fetuses and embryos, humans in a permanent vegetative state, humans suffering from brain diseases, and humans born with genetic disorders. Since these conclusions must have some impact on our ongoing moral and political debates about the proper treatment of such humans, this book will be useful to professionals and students in philosophy, bioethics, law, medicine, and public policy.